ABSTRACT Hazards are threats to people and what they value and risks are measures of hazards. Comparative analyses of the risks and hazards of technology can be dated to Starr's 1969 paper [Starr, C. (1969) Science 165, [1232][1233][1234][1235][1236][1237][1238] but are rooted in recent trends in the evolution of technology, the identification of hazard, the perception of risk, and the activities of society. These trends have spawned an interdisciplinary quasi profession with new terminology, methodology,, and literature. A review of 54 Englishlanguage monographs and book-length collections, published between 1970 and 1983, identified seven recurring themes: (i) overviews of the field of risk assessment, (ii) efforts to estimate and quantify risk, (iii) discussions of risk acceptability, (iv) perception, (v) analyses of regulation, (vi) Enter the risk assessors and hazard managers. Self-appointed or summoned by society, they come from diverse disciplines and professions (Table 1) Beginning with World War II and the development of the atomic bomb, an impressive technological revolution that has accompanied major expansion of certain goods and services has generated an alarming array of hazardous materials, products, and processes. These developments stem in part from the exponential increase in production of synthetic chemicals, the concentration by mining and processing of materials normally dispersed in nature, and the changes in energy flow and mineral cycling that accompany massive engineering works, transportation routes, and waste creation and disposal.
occupies a unique niche, for many technological hazards transcend the realm of ordinary experience and require expert study. Scientists can make unique contributions to each area of hazard management but their primary contribution is the practice of basic science. Beyond that, science needs to further risk assessment by understanding the more subtle processes of hazard creation and by establishing conventions for estimating risk and for presenting and handling uncertainty. Scientists can enlighten the discussion of tolerable risk by setting risks into comparative contexts, by studying the process of evaluation, and by participating as knowledgeable individuals, but they cannot decide the issue. Science can inform the hazard management process by broadening the range of alternative control actions and modes of implementation and by devising methods to evaluate their effectiveness.
Living with technology is like climbing a mountain along a knife edge which narrows as it nears the summit. With each step we mount higher, but the precipices on either side are steeper, and the valley floor farther below. As long as we can keep our footing, we approach our goal, but the risks of a misstep constantly mount. Furthermore, we cannot simply back up, or even cease to move forward. We are irrevocably committed to the peak (ref. 1, pp. [34] [35] .
Thus Harvey Brooks encapsulates an ambivalence that has come to characterize both scientific and popular attitudes toward technology. Such ambivalence may well mark a watershed that separates our age from centuries of equating technology with progress. In an increasingly technological society, the notion of progress persists, but now it runs up against a heightened perception of technology as hazard.
Enter the risk assessors and hazard managers. Self-appointed or summoned by society, they come from diverse disciplines and professions (Table 1) to anticipate, identify, estimate, evaluate, and manage the myriad threats attendant on technologies old, new, potential, and imminent. Their activity has spawned an interdisciplinary quasi profession, replete with its own terminology, methodology, and literature. The present paper examines a significant component of this fledgling field-the comparative analysis of risk and hazard. The review, which draws largely on a survey of 54 (56) . The novels of Dickens and Zola graphically depict the horrors of the Industrial Revolution. By the end of the 19th century a new science-demography-had emerged to record deaths and injuries. On the whole, however, the promise of technology held sway over its less savory aspects.
Current ambivalence toward technology is a much more recent phenomenon influenced in part by four trends in the evolution, perception, and management of hazard. Each trend embodies a kind of change: the first in technology itself; the second in the identification of hazard; the third in the perceptions, attitudes, and concomitant expectations and demands of people; and the fourth in the character of societal response to technological hazards.
Beginning with World War II and the development of the atomic bomb, an impressive technological revolution that has accompanied major expansion of certain goods and services has generated an alarming array of hazardous materials, products, and processes. These developments stem in part from the exponential increase in production of synthetic chemicals, the concentration by mining and processing of materials normally dispersed in nature, and the changes in energy flow and mineral cycling that accompany massive engineering works, transportation routes, and waste creation and disposal.
Commoner (57) has argued that these changes are fundamental and disjunctive, not simply a continuation of the processes initiated by the Industrial Revolution. In any case, improved monitoring has surely heightened the sense of technology as hazard. Major advances in analytic and bioassay methods virtually ensure positive identification of chemical and biological hazards (58, 59) . New screening devices, computer models, and monitoring and surveillance systems enhance capability for identifying, estimating, and assessing hazards (49) . Recognition (or even mere suspicion) of new hazards also stems in no small measure from a discernibly heightened public perception of danger and from increased expectations and demands for protection and safety. Though trailing both hazard making and monitoring, public attitudes changed rapidly in the early 1970s and now show signs of leveling off as a continuing, potent force in the society. The environmental and consumer movements have lessened in intensity since the early 1970s, but that is more likely a measure of success in institutionalizing public protection than a diminution of public concern (60) . In- deed, even in the face of grave economic recession-and a national antiregulatory climate, recent polls demonstrate convincingly both a persistence of strong public values for environmental quality (61, 62 ) and a mounting concern over technological risk (61, 63) .
The explanation for these perceptions, concerns, and expectations is elusive. Actual and identified increases in hazardousness may explain some of the shift, but other factors undoubtedly play a part. A recent report (2) points to intensified media coverage, the erosion of public confidence in risk-management (and other) institutions, and the perceived impotence attendant on a complex technological society. Real gains in the extension of life, the control of infectious diseases, the elimination of hunger, and the mitigation of insecurity from unemployment and old age have produced an affluent society that can better afford to concern itself with risk (40) . Thus it is only now, with more pressing needs resolved, that society can train its worry on less apparent hazards such as radiation and chemicals. Or perhaps we may yet discover that changing public perceptions correlate with broad sweeps and episodic fluctuations in moods of societal optimism or despair, in periods of economic prosperity or decline, in desires for risk or security, or in the politics of liberalism and conservatism.
Societal response parallels trends of increased hazards and their public perception. In 22 years (26) .
On the heels of these colloquia came the publication of booklength overviews and texts on risk assessment (11, 15 , 16) and a major casebook on technological shock (14) . The National Academy of Sciences stoked the fires when its Committee on Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 80 (1983) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 80 (1983) 7029 Science and Public Policy commissioned Lowrance to. take stock of the role of science and scientists in determining safety (11) .
A series of workshops (13) The 1980s, then, promise an inundation of book-length publications. The Clark University survey, albeit far from comprehensive, is broadly representative of the directions in the field of comparative risk analysis. Others may well find the list too long or too short and may wish to argue for exclusion or inclusion of this or that title, but such contentions do not detract from the utility of the survey in providing an overall impression of an unruly adolescent field. Seven recurring themes thread their ways into the 54 volumes. Table 3 lists the books in chronological order and summarizes the incidence of seven themes: (i) overviews of the field of risk assessment or some aspect thereof, (ii) efforts to estimate and quantify risk, (iii) discussions of risk acceptability or tolerability, (iv) risk perception, (v) anal- (20, 26, 76, 77) . In contextual terms, the most extensive view is that of Douglas and Wildavsky (40) , who regard the very selection of risks to be assessed as a basic cultural choice. Missing from most overviews is adequate attention to the first step, hazard identification, in assessing risk. Confident somehow that hazards will be identified in time, risk assessment concentrates on estimating, evaluating, and managing known hazards.
Estimating and Quantifying Risk. The precise estimation and quantification of risk is a major goal of risk assessment and receives the lion's share of attention in the literature. At least 38 (more than two-thirds) of the volumes surveyed include some discussion of risk estimation. One conference focused solely on the measurement of risk (28) and another conference (36) and a text (39) addressed quantitative methods for assessing risk.
Judgments on risk require reliable estimates and quantitative measures are the hallmark of science. Yet such estimates rely largely on extrapolation-extrapolation from past experience, from experiments (usually with animals), or from simulations (often with computer models). The particular applications of such methods all entail scientific uncertainty, the magnitude of which is variable, the handling of which is crucial, and the explicit expression of which often separates better from weaker studies.
In general, the degree of uncertainty bears an inverse relationship to the scientific understanding of the causal structure of a given hazard. For direct consequences of frequent, repetitive events with well-established causal relationships, it is possible to estimate with considerable accuracy individual or societal (or both) risks of mortality. Motor vehicle death rates in the United States, for example, have remained in the same range (18-28 deaths per 100,000 population) for more than half a century (78) . For extensively studied effects such as ionizing radiation, widely accepted estimates of the cancer risk from lowlevel exposure [a lifetime exposure of 1 rad/yr (1 rad = 0.01 gray)] vary-by an order of magnitude or more-according to Chicken (8) 1975 NRC/Committee for the Working Conference (9) 1975 NRC/Committee on Principles (10) 1976 Lowrance (11) 1977 Council for Science and Society (12) 1977 Kates (13) 1977 Lawless (14) 1977
Rowe (15) The Royal Society (54) 1983 Viscusi ( (70) , taking into account both benefits and the voluntary and involuntary nature of the imposition of risk, saw those risks "acceptable" to society "revealed" in the historic statistics of mortality. The stabilization of a level of risk over a period of time implies that society, through operation of the market, has accepted that degree of risk from a certain product or activity. Others have pointed out, however, that "accepted" is not the same as acceptable (81, 82) , that "acceptability" connotes a degree of consent that rarely accompanies impositions of risk. In this sense, "tolerability" perhaps better captures most actual risk situations (83) .
Whatever the label, more than 70% (in all, 39) of the books surveyed devote substantial attention to this issue. Most analyses proceed from an obvious assumption that all human activity is inherently hazardous to someone or something, that absolute safety is chimerical, that one must focus instead on determining the acceptable risk for a given activity.
That question reverberates at conferences and in the literature. One conference report centers directly on the question (25) whereas a second devotes a major section to the tolerability issue (42) . A Rand Corporation study presents strategies for formulating risk-acceptance criteria (24 (26, 40, 91) . Cost-effectiveness studies (5, 37, 92) seek to determine how much society is willing to spend to avoid particular consequences. Risk/benefit comparisons (39) allow for a balancing act to determine the degree of risk reduction that is in order. Cost/benefit approaches frequently entail putting a price on life and raise a myriad of thorny ethical issues (93, 94 (95, 96) . Another approach focuses on public process. The democratic process, buttressed by a wide spectrum of scientific information and policy considerations, allows for the participation of various interests in decision making. Some psychologists seek to inform the decision process by eliciting from the public its preferences for eliminating various risks (97) (98) (99) .
Another approach advocates direct participation by risk bearers in particular (5) or by the general public (46) in risk decisions through existing institutional processes. Still another approach stresses the role of information and the principles of informed consent (55, 100) . A paper at one conference (83) stressed the role of equity analysis. Finally, more pessimistic analysts, impressed by the uncertainty and complexity attendant on a specific hazard, find themselves overwhelmed by a seemingly relentless parade of new threats to health and safety (101, 102) . Thus, in its early years, the CPSC favored an ad hoc, case-by-case approach, which has been labeled the quicksand of hazard management (103) . The case-by-case approach has few advocates but numerous practitioners, however reluctant. Even those assessors who find themselves resorting to this method, however, seek a formula for improving the processes by which society makes judgments, expresses preferences, and arrives at decisions on risk.
Perception. Risk assessors have found all too often that their scientific findings diverge from popular perceptions of risk. Both scientific awid popular assessments of risk constitute judgments, the former made with the assistance of formal and sometimes reproducible methodology, the latter derived via more informal and perhaps broader cognitive processes. A considerable research effort, which has progressed from the speculative to the scientific, has gone into identifying and understanding the nature of perceived risk.
Perhaps more than any other work, the pioneering research of Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein-represented in virtually all collections of papers on risk-has enhanced the understanding of perceived risk. This trio of psychologists has elicited from various groups of experts and lay persons judgments of risk for some 90 The literature points to an increase in scholarly attention to public perception. Of the 54 volumes surveyed, 31 included substantial discussion of perceived risk. Moreover, 23 of these volumes appeared in the 1980s. One conference volume notes a mixture of speculation and empirical study (20) . Two sets of data-the findings of Slovic and collaborators (97, 98) The emphasis is on topics such as occupational health and safety (7, 55) , risk/benefit analysis as a basis for regulatory action (39), participation of risk bearers in regulatory decisions (12) , the role of scientific data (29, 47) , and the consideration of benefits in health and safety regulations (30) . One imaginative author proposes that regulatory agencies themselves concoct innovative alternatives to regulation-in the form of legal remedies, taxation, and other incentives (27) (13, 42) . Others stress cross-national comparisons (2, 26) . Some emphasize the need for comparative case studies of risk-management institutions (5, 45, 51) , of the media (45) , or of interest groups (8) .
Case studies, then, assume a prominent niche on many research agenda. In the sense of affixing a "needs-more-work" label, virtually all the 54 (34) , and a need to refine methods for dealing with uncertainty (51) . A number of agenda noted the need to conduct more studies of risk perception (25, 36, 54) . Underlying all these agenda items is a respect for the contribution of science to hazard management.
Scientific contributions to hazard management
The identification, assessment, and management of technological hazards involve an extraordinary array of professional skill and disciplinary backgrounds (recall Table 1 ). Scientists occupy a unique niche, for the hazards associated with the production and use of technology often transcend the realm of ordinary experience and require expert study, assessment, and evaluation. Scientists bring to this task their understanding of basic physical, biological, and social principles as well as traditions for weighing evidence, handling uncertainty, and fostering international collaboration and communication.
This review suggests a few of the ways in which natural and social scientists can make a unique contribution or exercise a special responsibility.
Basic Science. The primary contribution is the practice of basic science. No advances in risk-assessment methodology or practice can contribute as much to assessing risk as would, for example, understanding the process of carcinogenesis; the interactions of biogeochemical cycles; or the relationship among threat, fear, and human behavior. In restating such an obvious task, it is worth sounding a cautionary note. Carcinogenesis, biogeochemical cycles, and human behavior are extraordinarily difficult subjects. Despite occasional claims of major progress (109, 110) , fundamental understanding is still elusive. Within the time frame of requisite societal action in coping with hazard, such decisions will have to be made within the current bounds of uncertainty. Whereas improvement in basic scientific understanding remains the long-term goal of science, the short-run reality entails settling for ways of improving risk assessment and hazard management under conditions of considerable uncertainty and some basic ignorance.
Hazard Identification. In the main, the identification of hazards occurs through the monitoring of outbreaks (e.g., toxic shock syndrome, Tylenol poisonings) or by routine screening (e.g., the Ames test for mutagenic effects). Major advances have been made in the early detection of outbreaks and the routine use of monitoring networks and screening tests. In contrast to these "shotgun" methods of monitoring and screening, "sharpshooting" methods, using scientific theory, analog, and experimentation, serve to identify some hazards (e.g., chemical threats to stratospheric ozone).
The design and implementation of sensitive, low-cost, and acceptable monitoring and screening networks is a continuing scientific task, but it is an administrative and political one as well. Indeed, as successful monitoring networks become routine, they provide easy targets for budget-conscious administrations. The hospital emergency-room surveillance system of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, having experienced a recent cut in reporting hospitals from 119 to 74, is a case in point. Moreover, many of the resources for monitoring and screening are in the private sector. New social arrangements are needed to meld private and public resources under conditions of mutual trust. In this regard, the scientific community, with common interests that transcend employment, might play an exemplary leadership role.
Paced by advances in basic science, sharpshooting has moved beyond obvious concern with identifying hazards by their potential for the direct release of energy or toxic materials to a preoccupation with defining more subtle interactions. Surely this understanding of the subtleties of process, not only in chemicals but in all aspects of hazard initiation and management, marks the frontier for hazard identification. Attempts to control a hazard (e.g., flammability in children's sleepwear) may create a new one (Tris) or amplify exposure to an existing one (e.g., driver training in high school puts more high-risk drivers on the highways). Public identification of a hazard may lead to psychological distress exceeding that of all other health effects (e.g., the accident at Three Mile Island). Finally, new technologies (e.g., television) may lead to complex social changes, both beneficial and harmful, the magnitudes of which overshadow routine releases of hazardous energy or materials. To use the television example, control of radiation releases from color television sets took place early in the life of the technology. Generally, hundreds of studies have addressed information hazards such as the risks of televised violence (111) . Yet today we know little about the effects of television on child development and learning behavior even though surveys report that the average American child spends more time before a television set than in school (112) .
Risk Estimation. As noted, progress in scientific risk estimation depends fundamentally on progress in scientific understanding of principles of causality. Since many of the links in causal chains of hazard evolution are poorly understood, scientific risk estimation is essentially probabilistic and entails the handling of uncertainty. In this regard, science can inform hazard management in three important ways: establishing conventions, handling cumulative uncertainty, and presenting uncertainties to nonexperts.
Comparative risk analyses benefit from conventions in science. Such conventions (e.g., 1%, 5% levels of significance) ease the problems of standardization and familiarization in science even though they are inherently indefensible in absolute terms. Conventions in risk estimation would codify broad areas of scientific consensus that do exist and provide public reassurance about much that we do know and agree upon. From the perspective of comparative risk analysis, many sincerely held scientific differences tend to generate more heat than light. In the case of ionizing radiation, for example, widespread media attention to the recent report (79) Even if it is possible to arrive at a scientific consensus as to the nature of the uncertainty that surrounds a risk estimate, equal care should accompany its public presentation. Extensive research on the heuristics and biases of judgment under uncertainty suggest that both experts and lay persons systematically distort probabilistic meaning (105) . Risk-perception studies (cited above) confirm these observations. This research also renders it possible to describe better, if not best, procedures for publicly presenting risk estimates, although relatively few experiential studies address such methods (118, 119) . The NRC Governing Board Committee on the Assessment of Risk lists the following practical suggestions:
1. Express numbers with their qualifiers and ranges of uncertainty. Do not use highly specific numbers in summaries or press releases if they need to be qualified in important ways. Only use them when they can be explained in context. They may be taken out of context but we should not inadvertently encourage doing so.
2. When significant uncertainty exists, as it almost always does in risk analyses, interval expression is preferable to point expression.
3. Avoid using evaluative descriptions of probabilities such as large, weak, significant, moderate, and such. Wherever possible, provide numerical estimates with the appropriate caveats concerning their quality; in particular, estimates of ranges of uncertainty should be provided. 4 . Because untrained individuals have difficulty in appreciating numbers such as 10-8, judicious use should be made of comparisons with familiar events of the same magnitude. Care must be exercised not to seem to trivialize the risk nor to mislead about the uncertainty of the estimate (75) .
Another committee cautions scientists to beware of numbers. Quantitative estimates may impart a false sense of precision and imply that more is known than is actually known; the absence of numbers may convey a false sense of imprecision and suggest that less is known than is actually known (2) .
Risk Evaluation. Science can contribute to the discussion of what constitutes tolerable risk but cannot make the decision either for individuals or for society. This is in contrast to its key role in the estimation of risks. Indeed, a recurrent theme in the literature is the attempt to distinguish between scientific questions of assessment and value judgments of policy (120, 121) .
The division is not as clear as it may seem. Risk estimation is not in itself a value-free activity. An assessor's economic, social, political, or moral views and the context of the assessor's employment influence, often in subtle ways, the choice of risks to be assessed and the methodologies to be employed (122 (7, 124) , is much bargained for in the United Kingdom (125) , and is shared by labor and government in Sweden (124, 126) . Twenty-eight countries as diverse as Australia, France, Malaysia, Japan, and Greece have mandatory seat-belt laws-a practice that is viewed, surprisingly, given a strong regulatory bent, as "out of the question" for the United States (127 
Epilogue
In the first half of the 19th century, the hazard managers of New York City faced mortality patterns somewhat comparable with those of certain developing countries today: death due primarily to infectious diseases and infant mortality. Beginning prior to the germ theory of disease, they undertook to improve the public health in fits and starts that lasted 50 years and reduced by two-thirds the mortality within the city (J. Tuller, personal communication). If in the middle of this effort they paused to take stock they may have appeared to themselves somewhat as we do to.ourselves today in coping with the major causes of death in -industrialized nations-still debating the occupational fraction of cancer, unable to explain surprising declines in mortality (such aszstomach.cancer or more recently cardiovascular disease), and wondering whether socially or individually we are doing too much or too little in pursuit of a less risky environment. In the midst of' that great demographic transition, comparative risk analysts might have displayed as much excitement, sense of mission-, and confusion as they do today, albeit with fewer publications to their credit. But looking backward, we find splendid achievement and a hazard-management system, now codified-and conventional, replete with vaccinations, building codes, and protected water supplies.
We have benefited immensely from the insights of colleagues Christoph Hohenemser 
